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BUILDING MICRO-FOUNDATIONS FOR THE 
ROUTINES, CAPABILITIES, AND PERFORMANCE LINKS 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Micro-foundations have become an important emerging theme in strategic management. This 
paper addresses micro-foundations in two related ways. First, we argue that the kind of macro 
(or “collectivist”) explanation that is utilized in the capabilities view in strategic management 
⎯ which implies a neglect of micro-foundations ⎯ is incomplete. There are no mechanisms 
that work solely on the macro-level, directly connecting routines and capabilities to firm-level 
outcomes. While routines and capabilities are useful shorthand for complicated patterns of 
individual action and interaction, ultimately they are best understood at the micro-level. Second, 
we provide a formal model that shows precisely why macro explanation is incomplete and 
which exemplifies how explicit micro-foundations may be built for notions of routines and 
capabilities and for how these impact firm performance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Micro-foundations have become an important emerging theme in strategic management. Scholars 
increasingly realize that understanding such issues as value appropriation (Coff, 1999; Lippman and 
Rumelt, 2003a; Barney, 2001), resource value (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003b; Foss and Foss, 2005), strategy 
implementation (Barney, 2001), factor market dynamics (Makadok and Barney, 2001), inertia (Kaplan and 
Henderson, 2005), and firm-level heterogeneity (Felin and Hesterly, 2006; Gavetti, 2005) requires that 
substantial attention be paid to explanatory mechanisms that are located at the “micro-level,” that is, the 
level of individual action and (strategic) interaction. It seems that strategic management is now embarking 
on a micro-foundations project somewhat similar to similar projects in (macro)economics (Leijonhufvud, 
1968; Lucas, 1977) and rational choice sociology (Elster, 1989; Coleman, 1990; Abell, 2003a&b).   
This paper contributes to the emerging micro-foundations project theoretically and methodologically. 
Specifically, we address the emphasis placed upon routines and capabilities as key constructs in much of 
strategic management research and try to clarify the underlying logic of this emphasis. A central argument 
in much work in strategic management is that routines or capabilities are fundamental units of analysis, and 
that organizations should be conceptualized as repositories of routines and capabilities (e.g., Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Kogut and Zander, 1992). It is, furthermore, asserted in this stream of research that routines 
and capabilities cause firm-level outcomes, such as financial performance, innovation, and the boundaries 
of the firm (e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003). Thus, it is argued that explaining firm-level outcomes should 
take place in terms of other firm-level variables.  
Two explanatory gaps ⎯ of which we shall primarily concentrate on the second one ⎯ stand out in 
this research stream. First, there is little recognition of the need to explain the origins (or emergence) of 
routines and capabilities (except perhaps in terms of other routines and capabilities). Second, exactly how 
routines and capabilities are related to firm-level outcomes, such as performance, is seldom elaborated (cf. 
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Argote and Ingram, 2000: 156). Thus, crucial explanatory theoretical mechanisms are left unexplored and 
implicit.   
We argue that gaps related to underlying micro-foundations cannot be bypassed, they need to be 
explicated, and that in addressing these gaps one must involve the level of individual action and interaction. 
The reason is fundamentally that the macro (or “collectivist”) mode of explanation that currently dominates 
large parts of the strategic management literature, and which asserts a causal relation running directly from 
routines and capabilities to firm-level outcomes, is incomplete. To be sure, firm-level concepts such as 
routines and capabilities may be (indeed, are) relevant to the explanation of firm-level outcomes. However, 
they are relevant because they are useful shorthand for complicated repetitive patterns of individual action 
and coordinated interaction. Thus, the micro-level (i.e., individual action and interaction) ultimately 
replaces the macro-level (i.e., the postulated direct link between routines/capabilities and performance) in 
the explanation of how routines/capabilities and performance are linked.  
To clarify this argument, we develop a formal model that details the importance of the micro-level in 
explaining firm-level outcomes. The arguments, and the accompanying modelling effort, explain how 
micro-foundations can be built for capabilities and how they are linked to firm-level outcomes. Thus, the 
paper is offered as one way of furthering the received capabilities view in strategic management (cf. Zollo 
and Winter, 2001).  Specifically, we argue that the nature of routines is to internalize externalities. This 
argument harmonizes with the emphasis in the literature on routines as coordinating devices (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982: Chapter 5). However, because of asymmetric information routines only imperfectly 
internalize externalities. This second-best argument harmonizes with the emphasis in the literature which 
suggests that routines are often not optimal (Nelson and Winter, 1982). However, we diverge from the 
literature, first, by explicitly modelling the micro-foundations of how routines impact performance; second, 
by embedding our arguments in a conventional production function framework; and third, by modelling 
production externalities as giving rise to prisoners’ dilemma situations rather than to coordination 
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problems. Finally, we link routines and capabilities in a simple manner by arguing that a firm can be 
described as possessing the capability to realise a routine to the degree that it can repeatedly internalise 
such externalities (i.e., realize synergies).  
ANALYTICAL LEVELS IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
Many phenomena of interest in the strategic management field, such as financial performance, 
diversification patterns, vertical integration, competitive rivalry, etc., are placed on a level of analysis that is 
above that of the individual. In fact, explananda (i.e., the dependent variables) in strategic management are 
usually placed at the level of the firm. However, the explanans (i.e., the independent variables and the 
mechanisms that link them to the dependent variables) may involve other levels of analysis as well, such as 
the dyadic level, the industry level, or the level of individuals. Any theoretical and empirical effort to 
explain phenomena in strategic management has to make a choice that concerns the level(s) at which 
explanation takes place (Dansereau et al., 1999). A classic distinction in social science research is between 
the collective and the individual level (Coleman, 1990: 3-5; Lazarsfeld and Menzel, 1970), which in the 
context of organizational theory and strategic management corresponds to a distinction between “macro” 
and “micro.” We argue that strategic management research has too often located not only the explanandum 
(which is entirely legitimate) on the collective or macro level, but also all of the explanans (which is often 
problematic).  
A General Model of Social Science Explanation 
In order to clarify notions of “micro”/“individual level,” and “macro”/“collective level, as well as 
examine the relations between these notions and levels, consider Figure 1 which builds on the framework 
popularized by James Coleman (1990). This framework organizes much of our discussion and modelling 
effort.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 here 
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-------------------------------------------- 
The figure makes a distinction between the macro-level and the micro-level. For example, it may be that the 
macro-level is organizational whilst the micro-level is that of individuals. As shown, there are links 
between macro-macro (arrow 4) and macro-micro (arrow 1), micro-micro (arrow 2), and micro-macro 
(arrow 3).1 The figure also makes a distinction, perhaps more implicit, between what is to be explained (i.e., 
the explanandum) and its explanation (i.e., the explanans). In social science, the aim usually is to explain 
either a macro-level phenomenon (located in the upper right hand corner of figure 1), such as a firm-level 
outcome, or a link between macro-phenomena, as indicated by arrow 4. An example of the latter may be an 
observed correlation between the routines and the performance of firms in a population. To explain and 
understand a particular phenomenon (such as overall firm performance) the analyst makes use of theoretical 
mechanisms that are consistent with the arrows. Note that the arrows in Figure 1 are, from a theoretical 
perspective, empty boxes. They may be filled with different theoretical mechanisms, entirely dependent on 
theory development on the part of the analyst. (Our later modelling effort is an example of development of 
such concrete theoretical content).  
Macro Explanation in Strategic Management  
At first inspection, the framework depicted in Figure 1 would seem to formally allow for explanation 
that takes place solely in terms of arrow 4, that is, explanatory accounts that are wholly located on the 
macro level. However, whether arrow 4 explanation is deemed legitimate depends on (ontological) criteria 
related to an understanding of how the social world works (Mäki, 2001). Specifically, there are no 
conceivable causal mechanisms in the social world that operate solely on the macro level. There are no 
macro-level entities on the social domain that somehow possess capacities or dispositions to act 
(Cartwright, 1989) that make them capable of directly producing macro-level outcomes, and there are no 
                                                          
1 Hedström and Swedberg (1996: 296-8) refer to arrow 1, 2 and 3 as “situational,” “individual action,” and 
“transformational” mechanisms, respectively. Hodgson and Knudsen (2004: Section 7) calls arrow “downwards 
causation.”  
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processes of interaction between macro-entities that take place on this level. In short, there is no macro 
level causal mechanism that can be theoretically represented in terms of arrow 4.2  
However, arrow 4 explanation is not necessarily entirely ruled out. First, arrow 4 may be taken as no 
more than a representation of a correlation between macro variables in need of further explanation of the 
micro-level. This is entirely unproblematic. Second, arrow 4 may be used as convenient shorthand. 
“Convenient shorthand” here means that we can make use of arrow 4 explanations when we are convinced 
that they can be reduced to micro-mechanisms, but performing this reduction would not add anything in the 
explanatory context (cf. Stinchcombe, 1991). For example, there is no problem in asserting and showing 
that organizational culture perhaps is correlated with organizational performance. More generally, arrow 4 
explanation may be legitimate when the relationship does not appear to be particularly puzzling, for 
example, because we have a good grasp of the underlying micro-mechanism (Abell, 2003b: 261).3 Be that 
as it may, it certainly is the case that several examples of arrow 4 “explanation” can be found, such as the 
arguments that routines are a direct cause of firm-level adaptation (Nelson and Winter, 1982), “combinative 
capabilities” cause firm-level innovativeness (Kogut and Zander, 1992), and different “absorptive 
capacities” cause differences in how well firms learn from partner firms in inter-organizational relations 
(Lane and Lubatkin, 1998).  
It was briefly suggested above that macro explanation may be warranted under certain conditions. 
However, it would be hard to argue that these conditions are always met in strategic management research; 
in fact, it is rarely so. Thus, strategic management scholars do not have theories of why routines and 
capabilities impact firm performance that involve the micro-level, that is, at the level of individual action 
                                                          
2 Note that this point does not concern whether the explanandum can be placed on the macro level. Many (most) 
explananda in social science are placed at this level (Coleman, 1990: 2) ⎯ notably, most of the phenomena that the 
strategic management field seeks to explain.  
3 Moreover, it can be argued that for pragmatic reasons it is often times justified to do research as if arrow 4 
causation existed. Thus, Stinchcombe (1991: 379-380) argues that “[w]here there is rich information on variations at 
the collective or structural level, while individual-level reasoning (a) has no substantial independent empirical support 
and (b) adds no new predictions at the structural level that can be independently verified, theorizing at the level of 
[individual level] mechanisms is a waste of time.”  
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and interaction. Second, there is much reason to think that micro-level considerations add substantially to 
macro-level understanding. For example, a micro perspective suggests that macro-level heterogeneity can 
be an epiphenomenon of individual level self-selection. Further reasons why micro-foundations are in fact 
critical are given in the following.  
Why Micro-Foundations Are Critical  
We take the position ⎯ associated with “methodological individualism” ⎯ that the explanation of 
firm-level (macro) phenomena in strategic management must ultimately be grounded in explanatory 
mechanisms that involve individual action and interaction (cf. Hayek, 1952; Ullman-Margalitt, 1978; 
Elster, 1989; Coleman, 1990; Boudon, 1998). We also take it that the ultimate aim of scientific endeavour 
in the field of strategic management should be to identify and theorize the causal mechanisms ⎯ the “cogs 
and wheels” (Elster, 1989: 3) ⎯ that produce the observed associations between events (Cowan and Rizzo, 
1996; Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998).4  
Combining methodological individualism with an emphasis on causal mechanisms implies that 
strategic management should fundamentally be concerned about how intentional human action and 
interaction causally produce strategic phenomena. It is implicit in this view that explanatory black boxes be 
avoided (Boudon, 1998). Admittedly, black boxes may sometimes be justified in terms of explanatory 
parsimony (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998:12; also see Coleman, 1990: 16), as indeed happens in much of 
arrow 4-type explanation. Strategic management scholars know (or should know) that when they speak of a 
firm appropriating a revenue stream, this is shorthand for a complicated underlying process of bargaining 
between numerous individual resource-owners and other stakeholders (Coff, 1999; Lippman and Rumelt, 
2003). In a related vein, to say that a firm has a certain capability is essentially shorthand for a complex set 
of underlying individual actions and interactions, and associated characteristics or skills which make the 
                                                          
4 For an elaboration of mechanism-based explanation for a management audience, see Felin and Foss (2006). There is 
a huge literature in the theory of science on the nature and role of mechanisms in explanation. The interested reader 
may consult Cartwright (1989), Bunge (1997), Glennan (1996), and Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000). 
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realization of these capabilities possible. Because scholars may not always want to make explicit reference 
to complicated underlying patterns of actions, they often prefer to make use of explanatory shorthand in the 
form of collective concepts. This is completely legitimate. However, a fundamental methodological (and 
ultimately theoretical and managerial) problem in contemporary strategic management research is that it 
seems to be too often forgotten that explanation in strategic management should nevertheless have a micro-
foundation.   
Before proceeding to our modelling effort, we delineate, building on Coleman’s (1990: 3-4) insight, a 
number of reasons why micro-foundations are critical for strategic management. First, A problem with 
macro-level explanation is that there are likely to be many alternative lower-level explanations of macro-
level behaviour which cannot be rejected with macro-analysis alone. Even if a large sample can be 
constructed on the basis of macro units of analysis, a problem of alternative explanations may persist. As 
indicated above, alternative explanations at lower levels are readily apparent in, notably, the capabilities 
view, which seeks the explanation of differential firm performance in firm-level heterogeneity, that is, 
heterogeneous routines and capabilities. However, heterogeneity may be located at the individual level, 
notably when individuals self-select into particular firms.  
An argument for the importance of understanding micro-foundations lies in the fundamental mandate 
of strategic management: to enable managers to gain and sustain competitive advantage. To achieve this, 
managerial intervention is required, which inevitably has to take place with an eye to the micro-level.5 
Coleman (1990: 3) convincingly argues that explanations that involve the micro level have the properties of 
being more stable, fundamental, and general than macro level explanations:   
An explanation based on internal analysis [i.e., micro-foundations] of system [organization] 
                                                          
5 . For example, a correlation between collective culture and collective outcomes inherently tells the manager 
very little of what should be done to change culture.  Similarly, it makes little sense to argue that managers can 
directly intervene on the level of, for example, capabilities. Perhaps, however, managers can influence capabilities, for 
example, by hiring key employees (in which case the micro-level is directly involved) or by changing overall 
recruitment policies, reward systems, etc., all of which involves the micro-level.  
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behaviour in terms of action and orientations of lower-level units is likely to be more stable and 
general than explanation which remains at the system level. Since the system’s behaviour is in 
fact resultant of the actions of its component parts, knowledge of how the actions of these parts 
combine to produce systematic behaviour can be expected to give greater predictability than will 
statistical relations of surface characteristics of the system. 
To the extent that strategic management is concerned not just with explaining past performance but also 
with being prescriptive, Coleman’s point raises an important concern: The ability to predict is a condition 
for putting forward prescriptions. Micro-foundations are therefore an important part of strategic 
management as a prescriptive enterprise.  
ROUTINES AND CAPABILITIES  
The seminal and in many ways founding contribution to the capabilities view is Nelson and Winter (1982). 
Their conceptualizations and insights have been fundamental to the way subsequent work on routines and 
capabilities has developed (Foss, 2003; Becker, 2004), not the least in strategic management (e.g., Teece, 
Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Dosi, Nelson and Winter, 2000; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).6 In this section we 
look at routines, first, as dependent variables (i.e., as explananda), and, second, as independent variables 
(i.e., part of the explanans). We argue that in both cases the extant literature has a problem with missing 
micro-foundations. 
Explaining Routines  
                                                          
6 Note that there is a fundamental difference in terms of levels of analysis between Nelson and Winter (1982) and later 
writers in strategic management: Nelson and Winter were interested in building (evolutionary) theories that would be 
rival to the dominant neoclassical approach with respect to explaining and predicting outcomes at the level of the 
industry (i.e., evolutionary price theory) and the level of the economy (i.e., evolutionary growth theory). Routines and 
capabilities were parts of this analytical enterprise, but the aim was not to explain them per se. This also explains why 
in Nelson and Winter’s treatment, quite a lot is packed into the notion of organization routine, including a variety of 
behaviors (e.g., heuristics and strategies), organizational processes and arrangements, cognitive issues (e.g., 
“organizational memories”), and incentives (“truces”). The reason for this all-inclusiveness arguably is that “routine” 
is a catch-all concept for those collective-level aspects of an organization that may contribute to the relative rigidity of 
firm-level behavior that is so important in evolutionary theory. In contrast, strategic management is mainly interested 
in explaining and predicting competitive advantage, that is, a phenomenon that is placed on a level of analysis below 
that of the industry (or the economy), namely the level of the firm.   
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Nelson and Winter begin their analysis of routines from the notion of skill (Nelson and Winter 1982: 
chapter 4), which they define as “… a capability for a smooth sequence of coordinated behavior that is 
ordinarily effective relative to its objectives, given the context in which it normally occurs” (1982: 73).7 
There are a number of reasons why the skill metaphor is attractive to Nelson and Winter (see Foss, 2003), 
but the one that is of interest in the present context is that the notion of skills is used to establish a link 
between individual action and organizational routines, even if that link is merely metaphorical. Routines are 
conceptualized by Nelson and Winter (1982: 124) as the “skills of an organization” and as “a repetitive 
pattern of activity in an entire organization” (ibid.: 97). Routines refer to repetitive interaction that is 
somehow patterned, typically (but not necessarily) in the form of fixed sequences of individual actions 
where the specific sequence and the contents thereof are organization-specific (i.e., firm A may do things in 
a different order than firm B) (Cohen et al., 1996; Dosi et al., 1999; Becker, 2004).  
While Nelson and Winter spend considerable time on developing the notion of a routine, they are less 
forthcoming about the notion of capability, which is loosely defined as “associated with” “individual 
members’ repertoires … particular collections of specialized plant and equipment … [and]… the ability to 
operate that plant and equipment” (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 103). Unfortunately, they do not clarify how 
routines and capabilities are related, and much the same may be said of the subsequent literature that has 
taken its cues from Nelson and Winter.8 Because of this lack of clarity with respect to the capability 
construct, we shall primarily make reference to the less ambiguous routines construct, but later suggest a 
specific interpretation of what a capability may entail.   
Neither Nelson and Winter, nor subsequent writers in strategic management, have (to our knowledge) 
offered a rigorous analysis of why and how actions taken by different individuals in an organizational 
                                                          
7 In their discussion of routines, Cohen et al. (1996) echo this definition almost verbatim when they define a routine as 
“... an executable capability for repeated performance in some context that has been learned by an organization in response 
to selective pressures” (Cohen et al., 1996: 683).   
8 It has been suggested, however, that there is a hierarchy in firms involving routines, capabilities and dynamic 
capabilities and that routines, representing, “static” sequences of actions, are somehow at the bottom of this hierarchy 
(e.g., Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Winter, 2003).   
 11
setting should come to mesh into orderly and repetitive (reproducible) sequences (employee A doing X 
after employee B has done Y, etc.), that is, routines. It is arguable that the reason for our understanding of 
routines being incomplete in this manner is the lack of an explicit starting point in individual action and 
interaction. Specifically, it is necessary to examine the actions that an individual can take (e.g., routine 
action or non-routine action) and the payoffs associated with these actions before it is possible to ascertain 
whether the actions individually taken will constitute a routine.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Consider the left hand side of the diagram depicted in figure 2, which is concerned with the explanation of 
routines (i.e., routines as explanandum). In terms of the diagram, arrows 1, 2 and 3 are not given theoretical 
content in extant work on routines. Instead, routines at time t1 are explained directly in terms of routines at 
t0. For example, Nelson and Winter (1982) argue that routines change through the operation of other 
routines (“dynamic routines”). This is explanation in terms of arrow 4. A similar neglect of the micro level 
arises in connection with explanation that involves routines, not as explananda, but as part of the 
explanans.  
Explaining by Means of Routines  
Among the reasons why routines have proved attractive to strategic management scholars is that they 
are seen as representing the outcomes at a given time of a firm’s knowledge development path (e.g., Teece, 
Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). They are therefore relevant to the understanding of 
such important knowledge-based phenomena as heterogeneity, competitive advantage, inertia, 
diversification patterns, and patterns of innovation. However, as Argote and Ingram (2000: 156) lamented, 
to the extent that there has been progress in studying knowledge as the foundation of competitive 
advantage, “… it has been at the level of identifying consistencies in organizations’ knowledge 
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development paths and almost never at the level of human interactions that are the primary source of 
knowledge and knowledge transfer.” In other words, explanations of (for example) competitive advantage 
that involve notions of routines in the explanans typically reason directly from these to competitive 
advantage. In terms of the right-hand side of Figure 2, this amounts to explanation using arrow 4(a). Again, 
however, arrows 1(a), 2(a) and 3(a) are not given theoretical content.  
Understanding the firm-level consequences of actions being routinized ⎯ for example, why a certain 
routine may be a source of superior performance ⎯ requires taking a starting point in individual action and 
interaction: The routine may be associated with a high-productivity equilibrium (Leibenstein, 1987), for 
example, because it leads to superior coordination of actions (Camerer and Knez, 1996) (sans incentive 
conflicts) or because it leads to agents choosing actions that overcome latent prisoners dilemma situations. 
Thus, the causal links from routines to firm-level outcomes are never direct (arrow 4a in Figure 1); rather, 
they involve individual skills, motivations, and actions. Unfortunately, these individual level considerations 
have been consistently blackboxed in the received capabilities view.9 The following section is an attempt to 
open up this black box.  
EXPLAINING THE LINKS BETWEEN ROUTINES,  
CAPABILITIES, AND PERFORMANCE 
Conceptualizing Routines and Capabilities 
As noted the relation between the core constructs of routines and capabilities is far from clear in the 
literature, and definitions of these constructs tend to be vague. We suggest the following simple definition 
of routines and capabilities and how they relate: A firm can be described as possessing the capability to 
realise a routine to the degree that it can repeatedly internalise a pattern of individual level external 
                                                          
9 For example, Nelson and Winter (1982: 107) assume that routines represent organizational truces. 
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productivity effects.10 
This definition seems to capture important parts of what many scholars ⎯ not only Nelson and 
Winter ⎯ imply by routines and capabilities (e.g., Cyert and March, 1963: 120-133).11 Notably, there is 
more to a routine than merely sequentially organizing the productive effort of a number of independent 
productive agents. Their efforts are interdependent (as manifested in external productivity effects), and 
these interdependent efforts can be repeated (Cohen et al., 1996). Also note the cross-level nature of this 
definition referring, as it does, to both a firm (collective level) and individuals.  
One might ask why the routine should not be attributed to the (collective action of) individuals rather 
than to the organisation (thus obviating the need for an awkward cross level conceptualization). The reason 
for taking this route is that the literature appears to make it a requirement of routines that they are replicable 
by mechanisms operating at the organisational level (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 117; Cohen et al., 1996).12 
To put it somewhat differently, routines are deemed to be institutionalised to the extent that they are not 
overly sensitive to the turnover of employee and management turnover (and perhaps depreciation of 
substitutable capital assets) in realising the capability (Nelson and Winter, 1982). This feature must, of 
course, be a matter of degree and it is difficult to precisely characterise it.  
Firms as Averaging Mechanisms 
The way we propose to address these issues is by conceiving a firm as an averaging mechanism. This 
notion may be exemplified in terms of a principal-agent setting with one principal and a number of agents 
that cooperate in a team (as in Alchian and Demsetz, 1982).  Information is asymmetric in the specific 
sense that the principal cannot observe individual efforts and outputs. He can only observe the team’s 
                                                          
10 It is possible to conceive of units of analysis (e.g., groups) lying between the firm and the individual, and, thus, 
group externalities, but we abstract from this complexity as group-level phenomena also invite reduction to the 
individual level. We use the term “productivity effect” to cover all possible functions. 
11 However, some scholars pack much more into these notions, see, e.g., Levitt and March (1988) for an extremely 
expansive definition of routines.  
12 Of course, this might be a surrogate for a management group. 
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output; however, basing the remuneration of individual team members on team output introduces a 
prisoners’ dilemma-problem. Resort to some kind of monitoring is therefore necessary. Although he cannot 
observe individual effort, the principal/manager can, based on various signals, form an estimate of the 
average of input productivities and therefore an estimate of output, given the average. Moreover, we 
assume that managers can implement this average and that the means to such implementation is a routine.13  
The average mechanism conception implies that firms (i.e., management) do(es) not have the 
information to internalise the full micro complexity of external effects, which is why resort to some 
averaging procedure is necessary. This conception is consistent with the notion that routines assist in 
coordinating dispersed, tacit knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Cohen et al., 1996; Dosi et al., 1999), 
that is, knowledge that cannot be fully centralized in the management team. Second, it is consistent with the 
notion that routines whilst conferring potentially high financial performance may not be optimal (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982: 126).14 Finally, it harmonizes with the key idea in the literature that an important 
function of firms is to simplify the micro complexity of inter-individual external productivity effects by 
means of routines and standard operating procedures (cf. Cyert and March, 1963).15   
Fundamental Notions 
The following modelling exercise gives some substance to the explanatory skeleton represented by 
                                                          
13 This assumption is a very strong simplification and therefore also a significant limitation of the analysis. Essentially 
we work with a n-person PD game, but solve the game by dictatorial fiat, introducing an exogenous routine which 
captures the extent to which the firm internalizes externalities. In the present analysis the routine is not the explicit 
result of individual action and interaction. A full analysis would require also incorporating the left hand side of the 
diagram in figure 2.  However, considerations of space prevent such an analysis (for an attempt to model routine 
emergence, see Dosi et al., 1999).  
14 A pertinent question is why a routine, if it is relatively easily replicable, is best coordinated in an organisation rather 
than by markets or by multilateral or distributed bilateral bargaining (Coase, 1937). The preliminary answer is that the 
efficiency losses introduced by averaging in organisation procedures are less than those associated with these 
alternative mechanisms.  We leave the exploration of this for treatment elsewhere. 
15 One could go on to study productivity losses by introducing averaging under different assumptions about the 
distribution of these effects across the individuals/positions in the routine. For instance, if they are distributed 
normally then averaging will not introduce  significant  distortions though if they were to follow a power distribution 
(which they may well if the structure of external effects contains hubs) then the average will not capture well the 
impact of the effects.   
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the diagram in Figure 1. Specifically, Figure 3 which is simply an application of the Coleman diagram in 
Figure 1 to the present model introduces some of the notation and terminology used here. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 here 
-------------------------------------------- 
The basic analytical procedure is as follows. N individuals exerting certain skills at a certain level of 
motivation, X, could ⎯ in the absence of externalities in production ⎯ operate independently producing an 
aggregate output Yindep.. Under standard assumptions about production costs (which we shall leave implicit 
for the sake of clarity), there is in this case nothing to be gained from routinization. In order to provide a 
rationale for routines, we introduce production externalities as a network (i.e., a di-graph). Optimal output, 
Y*dep., now requires micro-level internalization of these effects. Consistent with the theory of the firm 
literature (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Holmström, 1982; Grossman and Hart, 1986) we assume that it 
is beyond the individuals, acting independently, to achieve such internalization. 
In this context, the firm (i.e., management) may be seen as a mechanism for attending to the external 
effects when the output is Ydep. Because of asymmetrical information, not all external effects can be 
(efficiently) internalized; hence, the notion that only average external effects are internalized. The 
application of a routine results in an output level that lies somewhere in the interval, ]Yindep., Y*dep.[.16 
In the following, routine impact on firm performance is defined as the explanandum, that is, we 
primarily look at the the right hand side of the diagram in figure 2 (and black-boxing the left hand side) .If a 
firm is conceived as a repository of routines, they are not necessarily independent of one another, as , 
reflected in notions of routine hierarchies (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Winter, 2003). The capability to 
                                                          
16  Thus, it is assumed that the routine will always improve output relative to the prisoners’ dilemma output (i.e., the 
minimum output), but will never be able to reach the first-best output level (the level that could be reached if 
information was symmetric).  
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realise one routine may depend upon the capacity to realise other routines (i.e., inter-routine synergies). For 
the sake of expository convenience, however, we abstract away from such interdependence and deal with / 
independent routines.  
Individual Level Considerations 
To introduce individual level considerations, let the productive output of individual i = (1, 2,.….., N) 
in the routine be Yi . Further, let the exogenous individual (micro) level variable be X (i.e., the bottom node 
to the left in Fig. 2). To ease presentation, Xi represents an interactive (choice) variable of individual i’s 
motivation and skills (i.e., “motivated skill”). More specifically, we can represent an individual level (arrow 
2) production function as a simplified Cobb-Douglas function:   
(1)         Yi  = bo  Xi b1 ri   
where ri  represent stochastic factors. In logs, this becomes 
(2)  log Yi  = log bo + b1 log Xi  + log ri   
ri has the usual stochastic interpretation (i.e., normally distributed with mean zero, uniform variance, and 
zero co-variance among the residuals) across the N individuals. bo is the total factor productivity of the 
routine. Again, to avoid notational complexities we have suppressed other productive factors (notably 
capital) which may be regarded as embodied in b0.  
Aggregating Up 
Under standard assumptions about the value (benefits) of Y and the cost of motivated skill (X) to 
each individual, the optimal levels of Yi,   i = 1,2,…, i,.., N, are easily definable in terms of equalizing costs 
and benefits at the margin. Then the total output, Yindep., is given by 
(3)        Yindep = Σi Yi           
where “indep.” stands for independent individual maximisation. Thus, the firm-level outcome is reached by 
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simple addition (i.e., arrow 3 in Figure 2). However, the notion of routines imply more than equation (3). In 
order to better capture the meaning and implications of routines, assume now that the individual production 
functions potentially take the form 
(4)         Yi *  = b0 (Xi  Σk aik Xk )b1 ei , 
where ei  represent stochastic factors. In logs, this becomes 
(5)        log Yi *  = log b0 + b1 log X i  + b1 log Σk (aik Xk ) + log ei 
k = 1, 2,…….…., N; k ≠ i. ei has the usual stochastic interpretation across the N individuals. aik is the 
weighting of the external effect of individual k’s motivated skill (Xk) upon individual i’s output 
performance (i.e., “Hawthorne effects”). In other words, aik represents externalities in production. In this 
context, the notion of “institutionalization” can be interpreted to refer to the extent to which the effects 
represented by aik can be maintained in the face of turnover; for example, strong institutionalization implies 
that aik is rather invariant to personnel turnover.  
It is convenient to interpret the matrix, A, of binary coefficients aik across the N actors as a network, 
or more formally, a di-graph, R = (N; A), where N represent the nodes and A the arcs. In fact, given our 
earlier remarks about the institutionalised capacity of routines it may be useful to regard the graph R as 
running across institutionalised positions rather than specific individuals. This conceptualization links 
capability and routines: The more an organization has institutionalised such positions, the better its 
capability of repeatedly realising the routine.17 It is as if the organization has a ready blueprint for 
organizational design (including task allocation) and HRM policy that it can efficiently and repeatedly 
implement in the face of even substantial personnel turnover (cf. Nelson and Winter, 1982).  
The significance of A is that it marks the potential for collective action in the following sense: To the 
                                                          
17 Thus, R solves (sub-optimally) a repeated game with turnover of actors. Note that individual incentives will not do 
this in a repeated or one-shot situation.  Repeated game equilibria require a stable population of players for folk 
theorems to apply. 
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degree each individual, k, sets her level of motivated skill at Xk, taking account of, not only her own output 
Yk, but also the impact she has on the other individuals in R, the value of  
(6)               Ydep = ΣiYi* 
 will be optimal. In general,  
   (7)           Ydep >  Yindep 
if, for at least one pair i and k, ai k > 0, and individuals take account of their impact on other individuals in 
R.  
Production in Routines 
If, as before, we assume conventional individual cost functions in X, it is intuitive that the individual 
level production functions (i.e., equation (4)) establish an N-person prisoner’s dilemma. Thus, the (Pareto) 
optimum is achieved when all players internalise their external effects in setting their respective X values 
(Holmström, 1982). Each has, however, an incentive to free ride and then Y (indep) will be realised, 
supporting the (sub-optimal) N person Nash equilibrium.18 The firm tries to prevent this problem by 
institutionalising a routine.19  
We now allow both parameters in equations of the form (4) to vary across routines j. Assume, 
without any loss of generalisation, that they take, respectively, the simple linear forms 
(8)  log boj  =   c01 Zj  +  log u0j  
(9)        b1j  =   c11  Rj  + u1j 
where again the u terms are both stochastic with the standard interpretation. Zj and Rj are variables which 
vary across routines, but not across individuals within a routine. These are firm-level variables that 
impact/moderate the relation between individual level motivated skill and individual output performance. 
                                                          
18 This is akin to the familiar team production problem (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Holmström, 1982). 
19 This may be taken as an interpretation of Nelson and Winter’s (1982: 107-112) notion of routines-as-truces. 
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Thus, Zj measures the variation in total factor productivity across routines (that is, effects in output that are 
not caused by inputs of motivated skill), while Rj is a measure of the extent to which the routine internalizes 
externalities. (We will return to this below). By making these stochastic functions we signal that arrow 1 in 
Figure 3 is empirical rather than definitional.20  
Introducing variation across j and combining (2) with (8) and (9) we obtain an expression for 
individual i’s productivity in routine j:  
(10)      log Yi j   =  c01 Zj   + c11 Rj  log Xi j + log u0 j  + u1 j  log Xi j + log ri j   
Note the dependence of the “error” on the value of X which in the context of empirical estimation would 
call for special treatment.  
 Variables Z and R are under the control of the firm (i.e., in practice management). Z is any variable, 
like size influencing economies of scale, which impact upon total factor-productivity. In respect of Z (our 
concern here) management has at its disposal three basic mechanisms for determining the aggregate input, 
X (i.e., motivated skill) ⎯ namely, firstly, an incentive system; secondly, monitoring and direct 
supervision; and, thirdly, the creation and maintenance of firm level cultural norms. 
 It is reasonable to assume that management does not posses the detailed information on inputs (X) 
and the strength of the external effects (aikj) in order to design individual specific incentive contracts which 
would optimally internalise these effects. Management could offer a collective incentive contract (e.g., 
profit or gain sharing), but this is open to free–riding (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). Indeed, we assume, in 
the first place, that individual coordination cannot be achieved, thus necessitating management (i.e., the 
firm). Management will, of course, expend resources on supervision and monitoring, but once again the 
details of complex routines will fall beyond their grasp. Failing sharp incentives and monitoring the 
                                                          
20 We here deviate slightly from the Coleman diagram; Rj impacts the coefficient relating the micro level variables X 
and Y rather than the value of X itself, which appears to be Coleman’s intention. This is captured in Figure 3 where 
the arrow 2 is drawn as incident into arrow 3 rather than into X. It does seem sensible to allow macro variables to 
modify the impact of micro motivational variables. 
 20
establishment of norms (i.e., corporate culture) may provide a partial solution (cf. Miller, 1992) 
In the round we conjecture that management can only be the recipients of noisy signals about the potential 
of the routine.    
In light of ththisearlier analysis let, 
(11)       Rj = 1/N(N-1) Σi Σk aikj Xik  
That is to say, Rj is the mean value of the institutionalised external effects in routine j. 
So (10) becomes  
(12)        log Yi j = c01Zj  + c11 ( 1/N(N-1) Σi Σk ai j k Xkj ) log X i j + log u0 j + u1j log Xi j + 
log ri j  
The firm by averaging over the external effects institutionalises the production functions across routines:    
(13)          Yi j = Zj c01 (  Xi j  ) c11 ( 1/N(N-1)  Σi Σk aikj Xkj )  u0j ri j Xi j u i j 
 With an averaging assumption the total output will be Y (mean) for any j, where    
(14)          Y*dep. > Ymean > Yindep.    
Notice that the collective/macro level variables, Zj and Rj, enter the explanation of the routines-performance 
link, not through arrow 4 in Figure 2, but by moderating the relationship between the exogenous individual 
level variable and performance (c11; arrow 2), or directly by influencing Yij (i.e., c01 Zj; arrow 1a). 
  Although the purpose of this paper is rather general, pointing to the necessity of a micro foundational 
model in any theory of routines, there are some possible empirical tests of our particular model. First, in so 
far as firm performance is attributable to institutionalised routines, then collective incentives are likely to be 
absent. Second, payment by results is also likely to prove ineffective. Third, for routines to be effective they 
will probably need to be complemented by strong norms (We return to empirical issues in the Concluding 
Discussion).  
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 Collectivist Explanation is Incomplete  
Armed with the above analysis, we can now examine somewhat more rigorously the claim made 
earlier that collectivist explanations are, in the present context, not tenable. Specifically, we can ask 
whether it would it ever prove sensible to explain the capabilities-performance link only in terms of arrow 
(4).   
Assume (2), introducing variation across j, is changed to 
(15)  log Yi j = log bo j + log ri j .     
This is equivalent to saying that all the individual level exogenous variables, embodied in rij, bear a random 
relationship to individual performance; there is no generalisable impact on performance of any micro-level 
variables. This is of course highly unlikely, but this is the only meaning we can attach to the idea whereby 
arrow 4 can constitute a sui generis form of explanation (Abell, 2003b). 
Given this change, (10) also undergoes change, namely to 
 (16)              log Yi j =  c01 Zj + log ri j + log µ0 j 
But (16) is depicted as arrow 1a in Figure 3.  Given (6), arrow 4 in Figure 3 is a transitive closure of arrows 
1a and 3.   
Thus, the above demonstrates that we can use collective level, arrow 4 explanations at best as 
shorthand or “reduced form” explanation. Arrow 4 must always be either a conjunction of mechanisms 
indicated by arrows 1, 2 and 3 or/and arrows 1a and 3. Thus, in explaining collective level phenomena, 
reference must be made to the level of the individual. A further interpretation is that individual-level/micro 
explanation replaces collective-level/macro explanation.  
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
Towards Micro-foundations  
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The field of strategic management seems to be increasingly aware of the need to embark upon a 
micro-foundations project. Scholars increasingly strive to build individual-level foundations for firm-level 
phenomena, such as heterogeneity, inertia, and superior financial performance. However, the perhaps 
dominant approach to firm-level heterogeneity in strategic management, the capabilities view, has seen 
virtually no attempts to build explicit micro-foundations. As a result, it is unclear how crucial collective or 
macro-level constructs, such as routines and capabilities, impact firm-level performance (and it is unclear 
how they emerge from individual action and interaction). This is unsatisfactory from the point of view of 
theory building in strategic management theory, because crucial underlying mechanisms remain 
unspecified.  Similarly, the “reduced form” approach of work on routines and capabilities also means that 
applied work will suffer from a great deal of indeterminacy in the sense that multiple, potentially rival 
stories on the micro-level can explain a macro-correlation.  
Finally, we are worried that the absence of micro-foundations in the capabilities view may contribute 
to a disappearing mandate for strategic management. In other words, the possibility of strategic action may 
become obscured by a too strong emphasis on firm-level constructs, such as routines and capabilities. It 
would often seem critical to management scholars as well as to strategic managers to understand and be 
able to impute actions to individuals, rather than collective variables. And if indeed routines and 
capabilities are meaningful variables, both strategic management scholars and managers should take an 
interest in the micro-level mechanisms through which they exert their influence on firm performance. 
Performance improvements may come about not just through selecting new routines and capabilities (as in 
Nelson and Winter, 1982), but also through changing or influencing the micro-mechanisms through which 
routines work their influence on performance.  
The main argument in this paper has, accordingly, been that micro-foundations must be built, and a 
simple formal model has been offered as an example of how micro-foundations may be built for the case of 
understanding how routines impact performance. In terms of the theories that strategic management 
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research draws upon, an implication of this work is that routines can be meaningfully interpreted within a 
standard production function framework (in contrast, Nelson and Winter [1982] are strongly critical of this 
framework), and that key insights from the economic theory of the firm (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; 
Holmström, 1982) on firms as vehicles for internalizing externalities may have a significant bearing on the 
understanding of the nature of routines. A theoretical contribution that emerges from the latter 
conceptualization is the notion we have proposed of firms as averaging mechanisms.  
Limitations and Future Work 
The aim of this research has been to make a fundamental methodological point, that collectivist or 
macro explanation is incomplete, and to indicate that it is possible to build micro-foundations for how 
routines and capabilities impact performance. Because of this overall focus, a number of specific points 
have (deliberately) not been developed. For example, we have refrained from directly discussing the micro-
foundations of routines themselves, and have taken routines to be rather deus ex machina like. The present 
approach may therefore strike some readers as not going sufficiently far in the direction of micro-
foundations. Ultimately, a satisfactory treatment should explain both the emergence of routines and their 
impact on performance (i.e., the whole of figure 2). One reason is that how routines impact performance 
may be related to which routines are allowed to emerge and such a feedback loop may be a crucial part of 
the dynamics of routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  
Another limitation resides in our focus on prisoners’ dilemma games. The usual treatments of 
routines tend to see them as solving coordination rather than cooperation problems (Nelson and Winter, 
1982). However, recent work has suggested that resolving incentive problems (i.e., problems of 
cooperation) may be an important part of what routines accomplish (Gavetti, 2005; Kaplan and Henderson, 
2005). Our model illustrates exactly this feature of routines. Obviously, however, such a treatment leaves 
out a host of other possible aspects of routines (for catalogues of these, see Levitt and March [1988] and 
Becker [2004]). For example, routines may contribute to shaping cognition in a firm. This aspect is left out 
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of consideration in the present treatment. Similarly, we remain agnostic on the issue of whether (or to 
which extent) routines are emergent or designed entities (cf. Dosi et al., 1999).   
Developing a clear picture of what routines accomplish arguably requires discussing one thing at a 
time. Still, it should be noted that although the reasoning in this paper draws on ideas from economics, it is 
consistent with a broad set of behaviours. In particular, the arguments and modelling effort in this paper are 
not tied to rational choice theory; learning and adaptive behaviours are entirely consistent with the model. 
However, we recognize that the view held by a scholar of what a routine accomplishes, and what are the 
underlying behaviours and how these aggregate will ultimately influence by which means he will explain 
the routines-performance link. For example, those who take a more cognitive approach to routines and 
capabilities (e.g., Levitt and March, 1988) may favour alternative approaches.21 We welcome such work.  In 
order to make a micro-foundations project viable in such a relatively diverse field as strategic management, 
alternative micro-foundations should be tried out.  
Finally, although the main purposes of this research are methodological and theoretical in nature, the 
issue of how to make micro-foundations testable and accountable to observed performance facts must be 
briefly raised. Recall the definition of a “capability” (to realize a routine) in this paper as the ability to 
repeatedly internalise a pattern of individual level external productivity effects. Thus, metaphorically the 
firm possesses a “blueprint” which can carry the firm, without drop in performance, through turnover (in all 
the functions that are connected to the routine) (cf. Nelson and Winter, 1982). Testing this idea, while 
linking it to the level of individuals, may involve starting from a certain sampling frame of firms and search 
for stable interaction patterns amongst personnel (perhaps across functions) through turnover. The resulting 
set of independent variables must then be related to some measure of sustained performance as the 
dependent variable. Organizations without routines would need to search and exhibit a dislocation in 
interaction patterns. 
                                                          
21 Indeed, much work on routines, particularly in economics, apply simulation methods (e.g., Marengo, 1996; 
Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004; Gavetti, 2005).  
 25
 
 
 26
REFERENCES 
Abell, P. 2003a. On the Prospects for a Unified Social Science: Economics and Sociology.  Socio-
Economic Review 1: 1-26. 
Abell, P. 2003b. The Role of Rational Choice and Narrative Action Theories in Sociological Theory: The 
Legacy of Coleman’s Foundations. Revue Francaise de Sociologie 44: 255-274. 
Alchian, A.A. and H. Demsetz. 1972. Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization. 
American Economic Review 62: 772-795. 
Argote, L. and P. Ingram. (2000). Knowledge Transfer: A Basis for Competitive Advantage in Firms. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 82: 150-169. 
Barney, J.B. 1986. Corporate Culture: Can It be a Source of Competitive Advantage? Academy of 
Management Review 11: 656-665. 
Barney, J.B. 2001. Is the Resource-based View a Useful Perspective for Strategic Management Research? 
Yes. Academy of Management Review 26: 41-54. 
Becker, M. C. 2004. Organizational Routines: A Review of the Literature. Industrial and Corporate 
Change 13: 643-678. 
Boudon, R. 1998. Social Mechanisms Without Black Boxes. In P. Hedstrom and R. Swedberg, eds. Social 
Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory: 172-203. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Bunge, M. 1997. Mechanisms and Explanation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 27: 410-465. 
Camerer, C. and M. Knez. 1996. Coordination, Organizational Boundaries and Fads in Business Practice, 
Industrial and Corporate Change 5: 89-112. 
Cartwright, N. 1989. Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Coase, R. H. 1937. The Nature of the Firm. Economica 4: 386-405.  
Coff, R.  1999. When Competitive Advantage Doesn’t Lead to Performance: Resource-based Theory and 
Stakeholder Bargaining Power. Organization Science 10: 119- 133. 
Cohen, M.D., Burkhart R., Dosi, G., Egidi, M., Marengo L, Warglien, M., and Winter, S. 1996. Routines 
and Other Recurrent Action Patterns of Organizations: Contemporary Research Issues. Industrial and 
Corporate Change 5: 653-698. 
 27
Coleman, J.S. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge (Mass.)/London: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press. 
Cowan, R. and Rizzo, M. 1996. The Genetic-Causal Tradition and Economic Theory. Kyklos  49: 273-317. 
Cremer, J. 1993. Corporate Culture: Cognitive Aspects. Industrial and Corporate Change 3: 351-386. 
Cyert, R.M. and J. March. 1963. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. 1993 ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Dansereau, F., Yammarino, F.J., and Kohles, J.C. 1999. Multiple Levels of Analysis From a Longitudinal 
Perspective: Some Implications for Theory Building. Academy of Management Review 24: 346-357. 
Dosi, G., Marengo, L., Bassanini, A, and Valente, M. 1999. Norms as Emergent Properties of Adaptive 
Learning: The Case of Economic Routines. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 9: 5-26. 
Dosi, G., R. R. Nelson and S. G. Winter. 2000.  Introduction: The Nature and Dynamics of Organizational 
Capabilities, in  G. Dosi, R. R. Nelson and S. G. Winter. 2000. The Nature and Dynamics of 
Organizational Capabilities. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Eisenhardt, K., and Martin, J. 2000. Dynamic Capabilities: What are They? Strategic Management Journal 
21: 1105-1121 
Elster, J. 1989. Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Felin, T. and W.S. Hesterly. 2006. The Knowledge-based View, Heterogeneity, and New Value Creation: 
Philosophical Considerations on the Locus of Knowledge.  Academy of Management Review, 
forthcoming. 
Felin, T. and N. J. Foss. 2006. Individuals and Organizations: Thoughts on a Micro-foundations Project for 
Strategic Management and Organizational Analysis, forthcoming in Research Methodology in 
Strategy and Management 3. 
Foss, N.J. 2003. “Bounded Rationality and Tacit Knowledge in the Organizational Capabilities Approach: 
an Evaluation and a Stocktaking,” Industrial and Corporate Change 12: 185-201. 
Foss, K. and N.J. Foss. 2005. Value and Transaction Costs: How Property Rights Economics Furthers the 
Resource-based View. Strategic Management Journal 26: 541-556. 
Gavetti, G. 2005. Cognition and Hierarchy: Rethinking the Microfoundations of Capabilities' 
Development,” Organization Science (forthcoming). 
 28
Glennan, S.S. 1996. Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation. Erkenntnis 44: 49-71. 
Grossman, S. and O. Hart. 1986. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership, Journal of Political Economy 94: 
691-719. 
Hart, O. 1995. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hayek, F.A. 1952. The Counter Revolution of Science.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Hedström, P. and R. Swedberg, 1996. Social Mechanisms. Acta Sociologica 39: 281-308. 
Hedstrom, P., and Swedberg, R. 1998. Social Mechanisms: An Introductory Essay.  In P. Hedstrom and R.  
Swedberg, eds. Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory: 1-31. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hodgson, G. and T. Knudsen. 2004. The Complex Evolution of a Simple Traffic Convention: The 
Functions and Implications of Habit. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 54: 19-47. 
Holmström, B. 1982. Moral Hazard in Teams. Bell Journal of Economics 13: 324-340. 
Kaplan, S. and R. Henderson. 2005. Inertia and Incentives: Bridging Organizational Economics and 
Organizational Theory. Organization Science 16: 509-521. 
Kogut, B, and Zander, U. 1992. Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities, and the Replication of 
Technology. Organization Science 3: 383-397. 
Kreps, D. 1990. Corporate Culture and Economic Theory. In J. Alt and K. Shepsle. 1990. Perspectives on 
Positive Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lane, D. and M. Lubatkin. 1998. Relative Absorptive Capacity and Interorganizational Learning. Strategic 
Management Journal 19: 461-477. 
Lazarsfeld, P. F. and H. Menzel. 1970. On the Relation Between Individual and Collective Properties, in 
Amitai Etzioni, ed. A Sociological Reader on Complex Organizations. London: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston.  
Leibenstein, H. 1987. Inside the Firm: The Inefficiencies of Hierarchy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.  
Leijonhufvud, A. 1968. On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of Keynes. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Levitt, B., and  J.G. March. 1988. Organizational Learning.  Annual Review of Sociology 14: 319-340. 
 29
Lippman, S.A., and R.P. Rumelt. 2003a. A Bargaining Perspective on Resource Advantage.  Strategic 
Management Journal 24: 1069-1086. 
Lippman, S.A., and R.P. Rumelt. 2003b. The Payments Perspective: Micro-Foundations of  Resource 
Analysis. Strategic Management Journal 24: 903-927. 
Lucas, R.E.  1977. Understanding Business Cycles. Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 5: 7-29. 
Machamer, P., L. Darden, and C.F. Craver. 2000. Thinking about Mechanisms. Philosophy of Science 67: 
1-25. 
Makadok, R. and J. Barney. 2001. Strategic Factor Market Intelligence: An Application of Information 
Economics to Strategy Formulation and Competitor Intelligence, Management Science 47: 1621-
1638. 
Manski, C.F. 1995. The Identification Problem in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Marengo, L. 1996. Structure, Competence, and Learning in an Adaptive Model of the Firm, in G. Dosi and 
F. Malerba, eds. Organization and Strategy in the Evolution of the Enterprise. London: Macmillan.   
Miller, G. 1992. Managerial Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mäki, U. 2001. The Way the World Works. In U. Mäki, ed. The Economic World View: Studies in the 
Ontology of Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Nelson, R.R., and S. Winter. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Rowlinson, M. 1993. The Invention of Corporate Culture: The History of the Histories of Cadbury. Human 
Relations 46: 299-326. 
Schein, E. 1982. Organizational Culture and Leadership.  San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Stinchcombe, A. 1991. The Conditions of Fruitfulness of Theorizing About Mechanisms in Social Science. 
Philosophy of Social Science 21: 367-388. 
Teece, D.J., G.P. Pisano and A. Shuen. 1997. Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. Strategic 
Management Journal 18: 509-534.  
Ullmann-Margalit E. 1977. Invisible-hand Explanations. Synthese 39: 263-291. 
Williamson, O.E. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: The Free Press. 
 30
Winter, S.G. 2003. Understanding Dynamic Capabilities. Strategic Management Journal 24: 991-995.  
Zollo, M., and S.G. Winter. 2002. Deliberate Learning and the Evolution of Dynamic Capabilities. 
Organization Science 13: 339-352. 
 31
• •
• •
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Figure 2: Explaining Routines and 
Explaining By Means of Routines
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Figure 3: Explaining the Routines/Performance Link
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